This week on The Changelog weāre joined by Adam Wiggins, co-founder and former CTO of Heroku, for an exclusive trip down Heroku memory lane. Adam and Jerod are both tremendous fans of Heroku and believe (to this day) they represent the apex in developer experience for delivering code to production.
We talk through the beginnings of Heroku, the v1 most people have forgotten about, the era of web hosting back in 2008-2010, the serendipity of Silicon Vally in those days, pitching to Y Combinator, the makings of git push heroku, the Heroku style and name, the sale of Heroku to Salesforce, potential regrets ā and we tee up part 2 coming next week with Adam going beyond Heroku and the story of Muse.
Adam Wiggins: Yeah, so most of the credit for putting that deal together goes to my colleague, James Lindenbaum, as well as Byron Sebastian, who weād hired as an outside CEO, and great guy, that I now count as a friend⦠So they put the deal together while I was sort of heads down in product development. But really, what happened was once we started to have this buzz that came with both the sticky product that was expanding in the Ruby community, and also just making waves broadly in the developer world, and at the same time, you had ā as you said, all those trends were really just on the up and up and up. Cloud was becoming a very, very hot space, and we had seemed⦠We werenāt getting into this business because we thought we were starting a cloud company, but indeed, people would lump us as one of the seminal sort of cloud companies. Something similar for - not necessarily Ruby as much, but maybe kind of startups, and companies practicing agile development, and developer tools, and developer experience, which is a term that Iām not sure if weāve coined it, but weāve certainly helped popularize it⦠And yeah, again, those other companies I mentioned, like GitHub, and Twilio, and New Relic. So there was just this huge lift in the market, and then we had - yeah, the timing was just right that we were a big part of the conversation there.
[56:09] So pretty early in the company, we started getting acquisition offers. And I didnāt really know how to think about those, because I hadnāt ever been ā even though Iād been a business owner in the past, Iād never been a venture-backed business owner⦠And yeah, I just didnāt know how to think about it when, for example, Amazon came knocking, and basically said, āMaybe weād like to buy you, and how does (I donāt know what they said) 30 million bucks sound?ā something like that. And itās just - I didnāt even know how to think about that, and certainly what would that mean for me, my partners, our investors, our employees⦠āShould we even think about this seriously? Weāve barely even gotten started on the product development, but boy, that sounds like a lot of money, maybe we should at least talk to them⦠I donāt knowā¦ā
So there was a number of these kinds of opportunities that kind of came across our desks, so to speak, and mostly my colleagues there that I mentioned, would engage with that in good faith, because⦠I donāt know, I guess you should do that probably.
And one that actually went very far was VMware. So we actually were pretty far in the ā I donāt know if it was due diligence, or something like that. I think we had a letter of intent. So we were pretty seriously planning to join VMware. Hopefully, itās been long enough now. I think the NDA has a statute of limitations or whatever, but the price there was 70 million that they were going to buy us for. And this was two, two-and-a-half years in. So that was just - as you said, even that was a huge multiple. And I did see it as, okay ā VMware was a company I really respected, and I liked all the people I met there, I like their brand, even though they are much more pragmatic sort of like infrastructure software. But I saw it as like, okay, as we had gotten further and further in this business, and especially once we went all-in on the platform, where the deployment side was important, there was this huge component of infrastructure⦠And a lot of that was about things like virtual machines, and Zen instances, and stuff like that. And I said, āThis isnāt really what I got in it for, and we need to build this expertise on our teamā, and we were indeed doing that, and hiring people, and just learned it ourselves as we went, and so forth⦠But I just saw that as being potentially a really good fit, in the sense that they had that expertise, and we could be the ones that were on the developer experience, application focus, in touch with these kinds of current cutting edge application development practices, like decentralized revision control, and so forth.
So it seemed like a really good fit⦠And oh, by the way, everyone involved would get rich out of this, right? Obviously, of course, you think about yourself, but also all of our employees, many of whom were ā this would be really life-changing for them. Also, the investors who had believed in us. Also Y Combinator, which at the time was an unproven thing.
So I wanted to find a good home for the business to continue what I was doing, and indeed, the way that we thought about it a little bit is ā itās not that different from taking venture capital. Youāre getting another source of funding that comes with it, and of course, all sources of funding comes with strings attached. This will come with some strings attached, but it also comes with some real strategic benefits.
So we were pretty far in that discussion, and I think I was ambivalent about it. I didnāt know what to expect from it. I saw a lot of ways it could go wrong, and most of all, I was not done at all building the product. I had way more to say, particularly around what we were calling the polyglot platform, being able to deploy languages other than Ruby, and so forth. So I was really trepidatious about that being interrupted by something like an acquisition like this. But I also saw all the benefits that potentially were there.
[59:49] So that was a VMware deal⦠And that was eventually interrupted by one of our investors, Steve Anderson, who basically came to our office one day and pulled us into a room and basically said, āYou know what? I think this is too cheap.ā And weāre looking at him like āHeās crazy, because āā I mean, $70 million⦠I couldnāt even fathom that number. I donāt know, maybe ā again, maybe Silicon Valley these days is just full of like eye-popping numbers if youāve been around in that, but Iām just some kid from Los Angeles, Iāve started a lot of businesses, but most of them Iām lucky if they get into the millions in ARR, at best. And so just these eye-popping numbers, and him saying āNo, thereās more potential here. Youāve gotta hold outā was quite striking. But he was really passionate about it, he made a good case for it, and we basically put together a new financing round that would let us let us continue independently.