Adam Jacob (co-founder and board member of Chef) joins the show to talk about the keynote heâs giving at OSCON this week. The keynote is titled âThe war for the soul of open source.â We talked about what made open source great in the first place, what went wrong, the pitfalls of open core models, licensing, and more.
By the way, weâre at OSCON this week so if you make your way to the expo hall, make sure you come by our booth and say hi.
Adam Jacob: Yeah, for sure. About 13 years ago I ran a consulting company that did automated infrastructure; I am a systems administrator in real life, thatâs my actual thing⌠And I had spent a lot of time doing automation, and building automation for a string of different companies. Eventually we started a consulting firm, me and some friends. We went out and our consulting firm was doing great; we were building a lot of automated infrastructure for people, but we were struggling to maintain it after we built it. So that led us to build Chef. We wanted a better way to manage bigger infrastructures, spread across more people.
We hooked up with a guy named Jesse Robbins. Jesse of Velocity, fame and former Amazon.com master of disaster. It was Jesse who was like âHey, this should be a company. We should actually take this thing and build a new product, raise a bunch of capital, and go for it.â So we did, and it really super-worked. We built this product called Chef that did configuration management. You describe how you want a service to work when you run it; it sees if they work the way you described, and if it doesnât, it figures out how to fix them.
[08:12] Our original business model was that we were gonna open source Chef itself, and then we were gonna run all of the server-side infrastructure as a SaaS. This was right at the peak of SaaS hype; this was when SaaS was taking over the world, and that was the business model everybody was gonna choose. It turned out that was not the best business model for enterprise software; they werenât quite ready to let their configuration information go out to a random personâs SaaS. But the open source part of what we did - we open sourced it under the Apache license, on purpose, knowing that we were sort of opening ourselves up to competition, but that it would garner the biggest possible spread of adoption for Chef⌠And thatâs super-worked.
We had companies like Engine Yard, BrightScale⌠Thereâs a pretty long list of those early cloud providers and the early people who built on top of those cloud providers, all of whom built stuff on top of Chef because of how the license was constructed and because of the way that we built that community, in a pretty open and collaborative way.
As we grew, that changed into selling on-prem software. We went from being âItâs all open source and you run it as a SaaSâ to âItâs mostly open source, but we sell proprietary software, tooâ, so we became open core. And we were always what I would call a pretty loose open core, versus tight open core. The difference there would be tight open core is like thereâs core features that exist in the product that you donât get unless you pay me money.
If you wanna back-up the database - that would be tight open core. Things that everybody needs. Loose open core means you build stuff around the core software, and then I monetize that. So if you wanted to buy a web UI, or you wanted rule-based access control in the server⌠Some of those things maybe you do. But it was disconnected from the core value prop; you could still just use the core of the software to do whatever you wanted, without having to do a lot of work.
We stuck with that model. We still had a SaaS, we still sold on-prem software, but sort of going back and forth through that and managing both the community, managing our business, what features are in, which features are out, why do people buy⌠And then most recently we took a long look at our business and why people were buying the software, and it felt like we were sort of on this treadmill of constantly putting features either into the commercial product or out, but ultimately people were buying the product because the product worked. The product itself, Chef, and the thing it did for them - thatâs why they bought it.
After a lot of soul-searching and looking at the business model, we decided that what we were gonna do is open source everything. Rather than have any proprietary software at all, we were gonna follow essentially Redhatâs model, where we were gonna open source all of the software, and what we do is build a distribution called Chef. And if you want that distribution called Chef, you have to buy it from me. And what youâre paying for is both the means of that production, my support, youâre paying for the marketing, youâre paying for all of those things that surround it. But anybody is free to take that software and build a distribution of it, and to distribute it under whatever terms they want to. They just canât call it Chef.
Thatâs the most recent evolution of Chefâs open source business model, and thatâs been working great. Theyâre having the best quarters theyâve ever had, we have customers who werenât paying us, who are now paying us, because of that change⌠So itâs been working pretty well.
From a community point of view itâs also been working well. Before this change no one knew how to build a release of Chef, but Chef. If you didnât work at Chef, this wasnât a thing you could do. Now thereâs a relatively robust community of people who are building new releases of CINC, which is the community distribution of Chef. Theyâre hosting it at the OSU Open Source Lab. Thereâs a much richer ecosystem for the software than existed before weâve made that choice. So that sort of brings you up to date, I think.